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A B ST R AC T. This Essay reports the results of a survey experiment that we conducted on over
eight hundred heterosexual respondents to compare associational attitudes toward gay men who
engage in different types of sexual practices. Specifically, we randomly assigned respondents to
hear one of three descriptions of a gay character, which differed only with regard to the
character's penetrative preference: top (preferring to penetrate one's partner), bottom
(preferring to be penetrated by one's partner), and versatile (having an equal preference).
Overall, we find that heterosexuals displayed heightened and statistically significant associational
aversion toward versatile characters and, to a lesser degree, toward bottom characters, relative to
respondents' willingness to associate with top characters. We elaborate why heterosexuals seem
to display systematically less associational aversion toward those men whose penetrative
preference is most consistent with gender stereotypes. Based on those results, we revisit the
notion, adopted by many courts, that Price Waterhouse sex-stereotyping doctrine cannot apply to
sexuality claims because it would turn sexual orientation into a protected class after Congress has
opted not to do so. Our results suggest that gender-motivated homophobia is not uniformly
targeted toward all gay men or uniformly present among all who discriminate on the basis of
sexual orientation. We also further consider why respondents were most averse to versatility,
drawing a potential distinction between "trait opposition" and "trait intermediacy" gender
violations. Finally, we discuss the implications of our findings for the broader LGBT movement
in law and society.
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INTRODUCTION
Many people are familiar with the scene in which an elder relative finds out
that someone in the family is in a gay or lesbian relationship and timidly asks,
"So which one of you is the man and which is the woman?" Some may also be
familiar with the considerably less benign scene in which someone attempts to
question a man's masculinity by suggesting that he enjoys being anally
penetrated, or to question a woman's femininity by suggesting that she enjoys
penetrating others. Employees have been harassed and discriminated against
for "tak[ing] it up the ass."' These sorts of references, whether oblique and
benign or direct and malicious, point to a certain cultural fascination with the
dynamics of sexual penetration. Moreover, this fascination echoes the well-
documented cultural importance that sexual penetrative dynamics had in
ancient societies' and continue to have in the LGBT community today.' Indeed,
many LGBT people carry strongly held preferences about their roles in sexual
penetration, preferences that can become a substantial part of their identities
within their communities.
1. Dawson v. Entek Int'l, 63o F. 3d 928, 933 (9th Cir. 2011); Bibby v. Phila. Coca Cola Bottling
Co., 260 F-3d 257, 260 (3d Cir. 2001).
2. See, e.g., Chris Brickell, Sexology, the Homo/lHetero Binary, and the Complexities of Male Sexual
History, 9 SEXUAUTIES 423 (2006) (noting the longstanding dichotomy between "active" and
"passive" sexual roles); James Davidson, Dover, Foucault and Greek Homosexuality:
Penetration and the Truth of Sex, 170 PAST & PRESENT 3 (2001); Ruth Mazo Karras,
Active/Passive, Acts/Passions: Greek and Roman Sexualities, 1o5 AM. HIST. REV. 1250 (2000);
Matthew H. Sommer, The Penetrated Male in Late Imperial China: Judicial Constructions and
Social Stigma, 23 MOD. CHINA 140 (1997).
3. See generally STEVEN G. UNDERWOOD, GAY MEN AND ANAL EROTICISM: Tops, BOTTOMS, AND
VERSATILES (2003); Wendi E. Goodlin-Fahncke & Kelly Ann Cheeseman Dial, "Do Me
Please, She Won't": An Examination of Personal Ads Posted by Married Men Seeking Sex from
Other Men, 33 DEVIANT BEHAV. 126, 133-35 (2012) (finding that online personal
advertisements for gay sex-in this case, posted by married men-frequently specify the
preferred penetrative preference of the seeker); Susan Kippax & Gary Smith, Anal Intercourse
and Power in Sex Between Men, 4 SEXUALITIES 413, 420 (2001) (describing the complexity of
the social significance that many gay men attach to penetrative preferences); David A.
Moskowitz et al., Tops, Bottoms and Versatiles, 23 SExUAL & RELATIONSHIP THERAPY 191, 191-
93 (20o8) (discussing evidence that gay men's "sexual role preference" self-labeling impacts
how masculine and powerful they are perceived to be within the community); Chongyi Wei
& H. Fisher Raymond, Preference for and Maintenance of Anal Sex Roles Among Men Who
Have Sex with Men: Sociodemographic and Behavioral Correlates, 40 ARCHIVES SEXUAL BEHAV.
829, 829-30 (2011) (reviewing literature finding that social class and racial stereotypes
contribute to expectations about what a gay man's penetrative preference should be, and
that bottoms face greater stigma among some communities of men who have sex with men).
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There is, however, essentially no empirical understanding of whether the
broader, modern-day American heterosexual population tends to judge people
according to their "penetrative preferences."' Do heterosexuals harbor
differential animus toward people with different penetrative preferences?
Would heterosexuals be more averse to associating with an LGBT person with
a certain penetrative preference? And what relevance could those attitudes and
prejudices have to law and society? This Essay makes a preliminary attempt to
answer those questions. To do so, we conducted a modest experiment in which
we introduced respondents to fictional characters and described the characters'
penetrative preferences, with an eye to detecting whether different penetrative
preferences might lead to different reactions from our heterosexual
respondents.
In doing so, we also introduced respondents to the labels commonly used
among gay men: one who prefers to be the penetrating partner is a "top," one
who prefers to be the receptive partner is a "bottom," and one who readily
engages in both is "versatile."s For this preliminary study, we focused primarily
on reactions to gay male characters in order to test as many hypotheses as
4. Although we think that the term "penetrative preferences" succinctly captures the nature of
these labels, other terms have been used. See, e.g., David A. Moskowitz & Trevor A. Hart,
The Influence ofPhysical Body Traits and Masculinity on Anal Sex Roles in Gay and Bisexual
Men, 4o ARCHIVEs SEXUAL BEHAV. 835 (2011) (using "anal sex roles" and "penetrative
roles"); Moskowitz et al., supra note 3 (using "sexual role preference"); Lijun Zheng, Trevor
A. Hart & Yong Zheng, The Relationship Between Intercourse Preference Positions and
Personality Traits Among Gay Men in China, 41 ARCHIVES SEXUAL BEHAv. 683 (2012) (using
"intercourse preference positions" and "sexual position preference"). Our terminology
might be criticized as being phallocentric because it implicitly makes the penetrator the actor
and the penetrated the object of the action, when we might have instead conceived of the
preference in terms of a desire to "envelop" (or sheath) or "be enveloped." We also
recognize that each of these terms might be read as having implications for a debate about
immutability. We take no stance on this question because the cultural and legal significance
that we attach to these labels makes no assumption about whether the trait is a strictly
unchanging identity or merely a strongly held preference.
5. See Trevor A. Hart et al., Sexual Behavior Among HI V-Positive Men Who Have Sex with Men:
What's in a Label?, 40 J. SEX RES. 179, 179 (2003); Moskowitz et al., supra note 3. These
terms are also used within the BDSM (bondage and discipline, dominance and submission,
sadism and masochism) community, except that the categories are "top," "bottom," and
"switch." See D.J. Williams, Diferent (Painful!) Strokes for Different Folks: A General Overview
of Sexual Sadomasochism (SM) and Its Diversity, 13 SEXUAL ADDICTION & COMPULSIVITY 333,
338 (2006). "Switch" is also used to describe an intermediate preference among lesbian
women. Francisco J. Gonzalez, GS ISO (m)other: A Gay Boy in the World ofLesbian Personals,
in OPPOSITE SEX: GAY MEN ON LESBIANS, LESBIANS ON GAY MEN 15, 27-28 (Sara Miles & Eric
Rofes eds., 1998).
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possible within a very short survey.6 Although our conclusions are stated in
general terms and may well apply to attitudes towards lesbian and bisexual
women, we have not sought to draw any particular conclusions about that
topic with this first study, recognizing that there may be real differences in how
female sexuality is perceived.!
What we found was that people did respond differently depending on
which penetrative preference we assigned to the character. Respondents
seemed to expect, and even to prefer in some cases, that male characters,
whether gay or straight, be penetrators or "tops." Our results provide a new
way to interpret the reach of a key case in antidiscrimination law, Price
Waterhouse v. Hopkins,5 which introduced the legal doctrine concerning gender
stereotyping9 as a form of workplace discrimination. Our findings support the
idea that some but not all heterosexual aversion to homosexuals and other
gender-nonconforming groups may derive from gender-motivated prejudice.
Section L.A sets the backdrop for understanding why Price Waterhouse
doctrine could be informed and modified by taking into account public
attitudes towards penetrative preferences. We describe what we call the "Price
6. The study was conducted via eLab, see infra Section II.A, where studies are generally quite
short, typically under five minutes in duration. Longer studies, in the ten- to fifteen-minute
range, tend to offer higher compensation to participants than we were able to offer. As it
was, our survey took five minutes or longer to complete for forty-two percent of
respondents and seven minutes or longer for seventeen percent.
7. See, e.g., Donald R. McCreary, The Male Role and Avoiding Femininity, 31 SEX ROLES 517, 517
(1994) (discussing theories that people respond more strongly to gender violations by men
than to those by women).
8. 490 U.S. 228 (1989) (plurality opinion).
9. Some legal articles and cases, including Price Waterhouse, refer to this as "sex stereotyping,"
while others refer to "gender stereotyping," without any indication that these two terms
have separate legal meanings. Scholars in a variety of fields, however, have for decades
distinguished between "sex," a biological category, and "gender," a category of social
expectations, and debated the validity and usefulness of this distinction. See, e.g., Anne
Edwards, The Sex/Gender Distinction: Has It Outlived Its Usefulness?, AUSTL. FEMINIST STUD.,
Summer 1989, at 1; Rhoda Kesler Unger, Towards a Redefinition of Sex and Gender, 34 Am.
PSYCHOLOGIST 1085 (1979). Accordingly, throughout the Essay we use the terms "gender"
and "gendered" in that sense, to refer to socially constructed categories of "masculine" and
"feminine," as distinct from biological sex. But given that the specific terms "sex
stereotyping" and "gender stereotyping" have been used interchangeably by several courts
to refer to actionable discrimination, for our purposes we need not and have not drawn any
legal distinction between them. We have, however, chosen to use "gender stereotyping"
throughout the Essay, except when directly quoting a source that uses "sex stereotyping."
The term "gender stereotyping" emphasizes that the stereotypes about sexuality discussed in
this Essay are socially constructed, despite being linked to physical traits like genitalia, and
do not follow inevitably from biological realities or anatomy at birth.
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Waterhouse dilemma": On the one hand, Price Waterhouse says that gender
stereotyping must not motivate employment decisions. Since bi/homosexuality
defies predominant gender stereotypes, one might therefore expect Price
Waterhouse to forbid employers from discriminating against bi/homosexual
employees on the basis of sexual orientation. However, Congress has
repeatedly failed to include sexual orientation as an explicitly protected
category under Title VII. In deference to Congress, even the most progressive
of courts have therefore only granted relief to bi/homosexual plaintiffs who
focus on their nonsexual"o gender-nonconformity- such as their manner of
speech or dress - rather than on their bi/homosexuality itself.
We argue that courts need not bracket sexuality altogether in order to show
deference to Congress. Section I.B advocates distinguishing between sexual
orientation and other related but separate dimensions of sexuality that could be
perceived as gender-nonconforming," such as a particular penetrative
preference. This distinction is important because although Congress has
rejected the categorical protection of sexual orientation under Title VII, it has
never addressed the question whether penetrative preference, as an
independent aspect of sexuality, is protected. Section I.C then additionally
argues that, even in the case of sexual orientation, a court can apply Price
Waterhouse in a way that protects bi/homosexual plaintiffs, but stops short of
categorically including bi/homosexuality within the protections of Price
Waterhouse. Echoing Vicki Schultz's discussion of same-sex sexual
harassment," we advocate a greater focus on employers' actual subjective
motivations under Price Waterhouse, which would leave open the possibility
that employers could express kinds of prejudice against homosexuality that are
not gender-motivated (e.g., religiously based prejudice). A critical question on
summary judgment then becomes how plausible it is that a given instance of
alleged prejudice against a bi/homosexual plaintiff was gender-motivated. We
discuss how our results regarding penetrative preferences bear on that
question.
Part II describes in detail the methods and results of our experiment. Part
III then concludes by reconnecting the results to Price Waterhouse doctrine. It
1o. It bears noting that confusion can sometimes arise as to whether "sex" and "sexual" refer to
biological sex or refer to sexual practices. As to the adjectives "sexual" and "nonsexual," we
have sought to use these terms exclusively to refer to a concept's relationship to sexual
practices, not its relationship to biological sex, in order to minimize confusion.
11. "Gender-nonconforming" means not presenting an image that fits people's gender
stereotypes.
12. See Vicki Schultz, Reconceptualizing Sexual Harassment, 1o7 YALE L.J. 1683, 1786-87 (1998).
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also draws in further related questions about other gender-nonconforming
groups, public opinion, and the future of the LGBT movement.
I. THE PRICE WATERHOUSE DILEMMA AND PENETRATIVE
PREFERENCES
A. Current Approaches to the Dilemma
Justice Brennan's plurality opinion in Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins" turned
the American legal system's attention to the concept of gender stereotyping. He
sweepingly declared, "[W]e are beyond the day when an employer could
evaluate employees by assuming or insisting that they matched the stereotype
associated with their group . ... "'4 The opinion held that "[i]n the specific
context of sex stereotyping, an employer who acts on the basis of a belief that a
woman cannot be aggressive, or that she must not be, has acted on the basis of
gender" for the purposes of Tide VII protections." Ann Hopkins's aggressive
personality was viewed negatively because she was a woman, whereas an
aggressive man would have been viewed more positively. Price Waterhouse
therefore seemed to hold that employers cannot punish employees for
possessing a certain trait if they would not also punish a member of the other
sex for possessing that same trait-in other words, employers cannot punish
gender-nonconformity.
Conceptually, the reasoning behind Price Waterhouse would seem to permit
an enormous range of discrimination claims. Gender stereotyping could
potentially include any and all assumptions about the sexual attractions or
behaviors that befit people of a given sex. Lesbian women, for example, are
discriminated against for violating the stereotype that women must prefer to
have sex with men. Moreover, gay men and lesbian women frequently are
characterized or identified by a particular appearance or set of behaviors that
does not accord with an observer's gendered expectations.
13. 490 U.S. 228 (1989).
14. Id. at 251. Justices White and O'Connor concurred in the judgment, disagreeing with the
plurality about the burden of proof placed on the plaintiff. See id. at 261 (White, J.,
concurring); id. (O'Connor, J., concurring).
15. Id. at 250 (plurality opinion).
16. See I. Bennett Capers, Note, Sex(ual Orientation) and Title VII, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 1158
(1991); Zachary A. Kramer, Note, The Ultimate Gender Stereotype: Equalizing Gender-
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Still, courts have remained hesitant to apply sex-stereotyping analysis to
discrimination cases brought by gay men and lesbian women, insisting that "a
gender stereotyping claim should not be used to 'bootstrap protection for
sexual orientation into Title VII.'"" This may be because some courts have
simply failed to acknowledge the logical connection between the cultural label
"gay" and many gendered stereotypes.'8 But even where courts explicitly
acknowledge the connection between gender stereotyping and sexual-
orientation discrimination, they refuse to extend Price Waterhouse that far."
A highly salient rationale for this refusal seems to be a sense of judicial
restraint: although Price Waterhouse's interpretation of Title VII's broad text
could cover bi/homosexual plaintiffs, Congress has had numerous
opportunities to expand Title VII to explicitly cover sexual orientation
discrimination but has not done so. In Simonton v. Runyon, for example, the
Second Circuit wrote, "[W]e are informed by Congress's rejection, on
numerous occasions, of bills that would have extended Title VII's protection to
people based on their sexual preferences."20 This rationale invokes what some
have called the "rejected proposal" rule of statutory interpretation: courts
should disfavor interpretations that were considered, but rejected, by Congress
as explicit amendments to the statute." Because Congress has for decades failed
to pass the Employment Non-Discrimination Act (ENDA), which would give
explicit employment protections to LGBT people," courts tend to believe that
interpreting Title VII to cover sexual orientation would contravene
congressional intent.
More generally, some courts seem to think that interpreting Title VII to
cover sexual orientation would be so categorical and socially impactful as to
step over the line between interpretation and amendment. Perhaps the most
17. Dawson v. Bumble & Bumble, 398 F-3d 211, 218 (2d Cir. 2005) (quoting Simonton v.
Runyon, 232 F-3d 33, 38 (2d Cir. 2000)); see also Medina v. Income Support Div. of N.M.,
413 F.3d 1131, 1135 (ioth Cir. 2005).
18. See Sunish Gulati, Note, The Use of Gender-Loaded Identities in Sex-Stereotyping jurisprudence,
78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 2177, 2182-83 (2003).
ig. See, e.g., Vickers v. Fairfield Med. Ctr., 453 F.3d 757, 763 (6th Cir. 2006).
20. 232 F.3d at 35.
zi. WiluAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR. ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON STATUTORY INTERPRETATION
547 (2012).
22. Jerome Hunt, A History of the Employment Non-Discrimination Act: It's Past Time
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direct elaboration of this reasoning comes from Vickers v. Fairfield Medical
Center, in which the Sixth Circuit wrote,
Ultimately, recognition of Vickers' claim would have the effect of de
facto amending Title VII to encompass sexual orientation as a
prohibited basis for discrimination. In all likelihood, any discrimination
based on sexual orientation would be actionable under a sex
stereotyping theory if this claim is allowed to stand, as all homosexuals,
by definition, fail to conform to traditional gender norms in their sexual
practices."
Recognizing this dilemma, courts have tasked themselves with the difficult
duty of drawing a line based on the particular facts of each case between non-
actionable sexual-orientation discrimination and actionable gender stereotyping.
One approach is to treat gender stereotyping and sexual-orientation
discrimination as mutually exclusive. The court tries to determine what was
actually motivating the employer's actions: the plaintiffs sexual orientation or
the plaintiff s other gender-nonconformity. As many scholars have pointed out,
however, in practice this exercise gives courts license to dismiss perfectly valid
claims of gender stereotyping merely because the plaintiff was
bi/homosexual." Plaintiffs may try to avoid this fate by concealing their
sexuality, emphasizing their nonsexual gender-nonconformity, or both." But
once some courts decide that a plaintiffs sexual orientation was in play, they
often altogether refuse to allow the plaintiff to frame his or her complaints in
terms of gender stereotyping. Although such plaintiffs may possess many
23. 453 F.3d at 764.
24. See Joel Wm. Friedman, Gender Nonconformity and the Unfulled Promise of Price
Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 14 DuKE J. GENDER L. & POL'Y 205, 221-22 (2007) (noting that
courts tend to dismiss gender-stereotyping claims brought by homosexual or transgendered
plaintiffs); Francisco Valdes, Queers, Sissies, Dykes, and Tomboys: Deconstructing the Conflation
of "Sex," "Gender," and "Sexual Orientation" in Euro-American Law and Society, 83 CAUF. L.
REV. 1, 24 (1995) ("[Clourts can and do (re)characterize sex and gender discrimination as
sexual orientation discrimination virtually at will. This practice employs sexual orientation
to create a loophole for sex and gender biases . . . .").
25. See Kristin M. Bovalino, How the Effeminate Male Can Maximize His Odds of Winning Title
VII Litigation, 53 SYRACUSE L. REV. 1117, 1119 (2003) (arguing that effeminate males
maximize their chances of success under Title VII by presenting direct evidence of gender
stereotyping rather than evidence of discrimination based on perceived sexual preference);
Keith J. Hilzendeger, Walking Title VII's Tightrope: Advice for Gay and Lesbian Title VII
Plaintiffs, 13 LAW & SEXUAUTY 705, 708 (2004) (noting that complaints that emphasize
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gender-nonconforming traits, these courts generally conclude that the
plaintiffs are being discriminated against primarily because employers have
inferred, or been made aware of, the plaintiffs' bi/homosexuality. 6
Under this approach, the idea that a court can interpret Title VII liberally, i
la Price Waterhouse, to cover gender-nonconforming plaintiffs, but cannot
amend it to cover bi/homosexual plaintiffs, requires an analytical leap: The
court has to conclude, despite the plaintiffs possessing many gender-
nonconforming traits distinct from his or her sexuality, that the discriminator
was primarily concerned with the plaintiffs sexuality. The court could reach
such a conclusion by inferring that the nonsexual traits were merely the means
by which the employer made inferences about the plaintiffs sexuality, or that
the nonsexual traits were eclipsed in salience by the plaintiffs sexuality. Thus,
in spite of the existence of nonsexual gender-nonconformity, the court leaps
directly to the question of whether sexual orientation is a protected category,
and concludes that it is not.
A second approach gives more serious consideration to so-called mixed-
motive analysis. The court entertains the possibility that, although the plaintiff
may have been known or assumed to be bi/homosexual, the employer still
could have been responding, at least in substantial part, to the plaintiffs
nonsexual gender-nonconformity. In addition to its sex-stereotyping holding,
Price Waterhouse also set out the first standard for mixed-motive cases, in
which a defendant is shown to have relied on both permissible reasons (for
example, job performance) and impermissible reasons (for example, gender
stereotypes) in reaching a decision. Once a plaintiff "shows that gender played
a motivating part in an employment decision," the employer has an affirmative
defense 7 : it can prove that "even if it had not taken gender into account," its
employment decisions would have been the same."
26. See, e.g., Kay v. Indep. Blue Cross, 142 F. App'x 48, So (3d Cir. 200s) ("When viewed in this
context, this record clearly demonstrates that the harassment was based on perceived sexual
orientation, rather than gender."); Hamm v. Weyauwega Milk Prods., Inc., 332 F.3d 1oS8,
1062 ( 7th Cir. 2003) ("Hamm has not made a showing sufficient to establish that he was
discriminated against 'because of sex . . . . [H]is litany of complaints about the actions of
his coworkers inescapably relate to either Hamm's coworkers' disapproval of his work
performance or their perceptions of Hamm's sexual orientation." (footnote omitted));
Spearman v. Ford Motor Co., 231 F.3d o8o, io85 (7th Cit. 2000) ("[T]he record clearly
demonstrates that Spearman's problems resulted from his altercations with co-workers over
work issues, and because of his apparent homosexuality. But he was not harassed because of
his sex . . . ").
27. Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 244-46 (1989) (plurality opinion).
28. Id. at 242.
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The Civil Rights Act of 1991 then statutorily adopted mixed-motive
analysis and clarified its scope. It allows plaintiffs to use any and all evidence,
including indirect or circumstantial evidence, to show that gender stereotypes
were in play in an employer's decision-making process. 9 Once the plaintiff
shows that gender was a "motivating factor," the employer has already
committed an unlawful employment practice.o If the employer successfully
establishes the "same decision" affirmative defense, then the plaintiff cannot
recover damages or an injunction mandating hiring, reinstatement, or
promotion." The plaintiff can still, however, recover declarative relief,
attorney's fees, and other forms of injunctive relief."
In light of mixed-motive analysis, some courts have reasoned that the mere
existence of a defendant's prejudice against bi/homosexuality should not rule
out the possibility of concomitant gender stereotyping. In Prowel v. Wise
Business Forms, Inc., the Third Circuit explained:
To be sure, the District Court correctly noted that the record is replete
with evidence of harassment motivated by Prowel's sexual orientation.
Thus, it is possible that the harassment Prowel alleges was because of
his sexual orientation, not his effeminacy. Nevertheless, this does not
vitiate the possibility that Prowel was also harassed for his failure to
conform to gender stereotypes."
Of particular interest to the court was the fact that Brian Prowel had detailed
many examples of "effeminate" behaviors, such as crossing his legs, filing his
nails, speaking with a high-pitched voice, and having an interest in design, all
in addition to the fact that his coworkers knew him to be gay. 4 It was therefore
plausible that, even after subtracting out his employer's knowledge (or
assumptions) about his sexual orientation, Prowel still would have been
discriminated against.
In Centola v. Potter, seven years earlier, Judge Nancy Gertner of the United
29. Prior to the passage of the 1991 Civil Rights Act, the Court had required "direct evidence" of
the employer's motivations. Id. at 276 (O'Connor, J., concurring). In Desert Palace, Inc. v.
Costa, 539 U.S. 90, 99-101 (2003), the Court recognized that Congress decided not to adopt
the direct evidence requirement, and therefore plaintiffs could use any evidence to meet
their burden.
30. 42 U.S.C. § 200oe-2(m) (20o6).
31. Id. § 2000e-5(g)(2)(B)(ii).
32. Id. § 2000e-5(g)(2)(B)(i).
33. 579 F.3d 285, 292 (3 d Cir. 2009).
34. Id. at 291-92.
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States District Court for the District of Massachusetts had already articulated a
much more emphatic version of the same basic idea." Judge Gertner's opinion
stressed that evidence of prejudice against bi/homosexuality should in no way
serve to obscure or nullify evidence of concomitant gender stereotyping.
Acknowledging that the distinction between gender stereotyping and prejudice
against bi/homosexuality can often be blurry, Judge Gertner reasoned that
bi/homosexual plaintiffs should nonetheless be able to present facts that
combine both sources of prejudice. 6 As long as the defendants' discrimination
was based on gender stereotypes, she concluded, the fact that those prejudices
coexisted with other lawful (that is, pure anti-bi/homosexual) prejudice was
irrelevant."
The idea here is that as long as a plaintiff can show that her failure to
conform to gender stereotypes was a "motivating factor," she can invoke Title
VII. Under this theory, the court should simply bracket the matter of the
plaintiffs bi/homosexuality, considering it neither to support nor to
undermine the plaintiffs case. The defendant's additional prejudice against
bi/homosexuality may then be relevant to the employer's partial affirmative
defense: "Yes, I had gender stereotypes on the mind, but I would have made
the same decision anyway because I knew the plaintiff was gay and did not
like that."
B. The Dilemma and Penetrative Preferences: Distinguishing Dimensions of
Sexuality
In this Section, we argue that the Price Waterhouse doctrine ought to be
expanded to recognize the potential for gender stereotyping of sexual traits that
are nonetheless distinct from sexual orientation. The upshot of opinions like
Prowel and Centola is that drawing the plaintiffs sexual traits into the
calculation does not necessarily bring a Price Waterhouse claim to a dead end.
But even under Prowel and Centola, the only escape from the dead end entails
focusing only on those of the plaintiffs traits that are gendered, but have
nothing to do with the plaintiff's sexuality. That is, a plaintiff has to argue that
his or her employer was motivated by some gendered trait (e.g., manner of
dress, pitch of voice) that was completely separate from the plaintiffs sex life.
The Prowel-Centola approach may indeed direct Tide VII's protections to
3S. See 183 F. Supp. 2d 4o3, 408-10 (D. Mass. 2002).
36. Id.
37. Id. at 41o.
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the most marginalized plaintiffs. Social psychology studies have found,
unsurprisingly, that respondents generally have more positive views of gender-
conforming ("straight-acting") homosexuals than of gender-nonconforming
homosexuals.'8 The problem is that many gay men and lesbian women cannot
put forward a discrimination claim based on their nonsexual gender-
nonconformity because their gender violations, aside from the fact of their
bi/homosexuality, may be comparatively subtle-that is, they are relatively
"straight-acting." But these men and women still face prejudice. The evidence
is mixed, but at least among certain populations of respondents, aversive
attitudes towards bi/homosexual people persist independent of any "extra"
gender violations. 9 Unfortunately, courts tend to leave these plaintiffs
categorically without recourse under federal law. And although many states
have adopted laws against sexual-orientation discrimination, many others
have not.4 o
We want to suggest that the current understanding of the Price Waterhouse
dilemma overstates the deference that is owed to Congress's rejection of
ENDA, even assuming that the "rejected proposal" rule is persuasive. The
current understanding conflates the entire realm of sexuality with the sex of
one's partners. Both early and recent versions of ENDA have defined "sexual
38. See Aaron J. Blashill & Kimberly K. Powlishta, Effects of Gender-Related Domain Violations
and Sexual Orientation on Perceptions of Male and Female Targets: An Analogue Study, 41
ARCHIVEs SEXUAL BEHAV. 1293 (2012); Peter Glick et al., Defensive Reactions to Masculinity
Threat: More Negative Affect Toward Effeminate (but Not Masculine) Gay Men, 57 SEX ROLES 55
(2007); Mary Riege Laner & Roy H. Laner, Sexual Preference or Personal Style? Why Lesbians
Are Disliked, 5 J. HOMOSEXUALITY 339 (1980); see also Robert D. Schope & Michele J.
Eliason, Sissies and Tomboys: Gender Role Behaviors and Homophobia, 16 J. GAY & LESBIAN
Soc. SERVS. 73, 93 (2004) (finding "limited support for the idea that heterosexuals react
according to whether the gay or lesbian individuals adhere to or violate socially determined
gender role behaviors," though concluding that the mere fact of homosexuality is a stronger
predictor than gender-nonconformity of negative reactions to homosexuals).
3g. One study found negative attitudes towards homosexuals regardless of behavior and
appearance but did not have a control group of heterosexual targets to which to compare the
negativity. Schope & Eliason, supra note 38. Another study found no general antipathy
towards gay male targets. Robert W. Mitchell & Alan L. Ellis, In the Eye of the Beholder:
Knowledge that a Man Is Gay Promotes American College Students'Attributions of Cross-Gender
Characteristics, 15 SEXUALITY & CULTURE 8o (2011). One study found a small independent
effect for the target's homosexuality among "high prejudice" subjects. Keren Lehavot & Alan
J. Lambert, Toward a Greater Understanding of Antigay Prejudice: On the Role of Sexual
Orientation and Gender Role Violation, 29 BASIc & APPLIED Soc. PSYCHOL. 279 (2007).
And another study found the same result among male subjects. Blashill & Powlishta, supra
note 38.
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orientation" as "homosexuality, heterosexuality, or bisexuality," and nothing
more.4 ' Dictionaries vary slightly in their definitions, but Merriam-Webster, for
example, defines "homosexuality" as "erotic activity with another of the same
sex."' What Congress seems to have rejected, therefore, is the categorical
protection of a class of individuals defined by whom they have sex with or have
sexual desire for. Nowhere has Congress rejected an interpretation of Title VII
that concerns how individuals have sex.
Courts should therefore have less hesitation about taking account of other
dimensions of sexuality when they are (a) distinct from the sex of one's desired
or actual sexual partners, but still (b) gendered in some way and therefore
within the reach of Price Waterhouse, and (c) plausibly the source of
discrimination. We believe that penetrative preferences may be just such a
dimension based on the kind of pejorative language seen in discrimination
cases up to now (for example, about employees who "take it up the ass") .
And, as we will explain, our empirical study supports that conclusion.
Moreover, because of mixed-motive analysis, courts could take account of
gender stereotyping of penetrative preferences, even though in the vast
majority of cases employers would probably also be motivated by general
prejudice against bi/homosexuality.
It is appropriate for courts to distinguish between discrimination based on
sexual orientation and discrimination based on penetrative preference because
there are real differences that make penetrative preference something more
than just a proxy for bi/homosexuality. First, any particular penetrative
preference is a category that would include members of all sexual orientations,
including heterosexual. Although penetrative preferences that might be
perceived as gender-nonconforming are probably more prevalent among
bi/homosexual populations, nothing in principle prevents an employer from
taking issue with the gender-nonconformity of heterosexual employees' sex
lives. Especially in the age of modern sexual equipment, nothing prevents
heterosexuals from reversing conventional penetrative roles, and heterosexual
couples are increasingly doing so."
Second, drawing penetrative preference under the Price Waterhouse sex-
stereotyping umbrella would not categorically extend protection to all
41. H.R. 1397, 112th Cong. 5 3(a)(9) (2011); see also H.R. 1863, io4th Cong. § 17(9) (1995).
42. Homosexuality, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary
/homosexuality (last visited Aug. 31, 2013).
43. See supra note 1 and accompanying text.
44. See Tracy Clark-Flory, Bringing Up the Rear, SALON (Mar. 26, 2011, 8:ol PM),
http://www.salon.com/2o11/o3/27/pegging.
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bi/homosexual employees. There is diversity among gay men's penetrative
preferences,s as well as their perceived penetrative preferences.46 Plaintiffs
would have to show that gendered stereotypes about their particular
penetrative preference (real or perceived) actually "motivated" their employers,
and this will often be difficult to do. To begin with, in a world where many
heterosexuals perhaps never need to contemplate penetrative roles at all, some
employers may altogether lack ideation about penetrative preferences.
Additionally, a given employer may not be prejudiced against the particular
penetrative preference that it believes the employee in question holds. For
example, an employer could be prejudiced against men who are the more
sexually "female" partner in a way that would only reach bi/homosexual
employees perceived to be bottoms.
With this understanding, the deference owed to congressional inaction is
quite modest in scope: a court should not stop an employer from merely taking
issue with the sex of a plaintiffs romantic partners (or the targets of the
plaintiffs desires) because Congress has had opportunities to endorse that
possibility but has chosen not to do so. Under Price Waterhouse, however, a
court still may stop an employer from using gender norms about how people
should have sex (what it means to "act like a (wo)man" in one's sex life) as a
basis for punishing its employees. This approach to the Price Waterhouse
dilemma would allow courts to extend limited protection to plaintiffs who lack
prominent nonsexual gender-nonconformity but are nonetheless targets of
discrimination.
C. The Dilemma and Penetrative Preferences: Closer Examination ofthe Source
of Prejudice Against B i/Homosexuality
Our study of penetrative preferences will also shed light on a second, and
broader, possibility: expanding the scope of Price Waterhouse to cover
bi/homosexuality itself- that is, the sex of one's actual or desired sexual
partners -in some cases, while still stopping short of a categorical amendment
to Title VII. In addition to what we advocated in Section I.B, we support the
following idea: just as a court can separate prejudice against bi/homosexuality
(i.e., discriminating against gay men as such) from prejudice against nonsexual
gendered traits (e.g., discriminating against men with high-pitched voices), a
court might also separate gender-motivated prejudice against bi/homosexuality
45. See Moskowitz et al., supra note 3.
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(e.g., discriminating against gay men because "real" men are only attracted to
women) from gender-indifferent prejudice against bi/homosexuality (e.g.,
discriminating against gay men on the presumption that they are promiscuous
or psychologically troubled). Under this framing of Price Waterhouse, if a
defendant's prejudice against bi/homosexuality is gender-motivated, it should
be impermissible, but if it is gender-indifferent, it should be permissible. This
is indeed the same approach that Vicki Schultz has advocated for determining
whether same-sex sexual harassment is or is not based on gender violations.'
The Price Waterhouse dilemma arises in part because of how prejudice
against bi/homosexuality is conceptualized. One understanding of whether or
not prejudice is gendered is strictly formal: if the prejudice could be made to
disappear by switching the target's sex, then it is gendered. In general,
homosexuality fits that mold (though bisexuality is more complicated).
Therefore, if a court adopts that formal understanding, any form of prejudice
against homosexuality appears gendered. Framing the issue in this way
understandably heightens the anxiety caused by the Price Waterhouse dilemma.
It seems to present an all-or-nothing choice: either categorically limit the reach
of Price Waterhouse or else categorically defy Congress. Ironically, scholarship
advocating recognition of the conceptual connection between sexual-
orientation discrimination and gender stereotypin48 may actually contribute to
this anxiety.
But we must not forget that liability under Price Waterhouse, as with any
disparate treatment theory of liability under Title VII, relies upon inferences
about the discriminator's actual, subjective state of mind."9 As a theoretical
matter, homosexuality is characterized by its defiance of the stereotype that
people should have only opposite-sex partners. It does not follow from that,
however, that gender stereotypes necessarily attained salience in the mind of
any particular person accused of discrimination enough to have "played a
47. Schultz, supra note 12, at 1787 ("Although this analysis recognizes that same-sex, gender-
based hostile work environment harassment may include antigay conduct, it does not
conflate harassment on the basis of gender with harassment on the basis of sexual
orientation. Consequently, courts should not be concerned that adopting this approach
would merely accomplish indirectly a prohibition against sexual orientation discrimination
that Congress has, so far, declined to do directly.").
48. See, e.g., Capers, supra note 16; Gulati, supra note 18; Kramer, supra note 16.
49. 490 U.S. 228, 250 (1989) (plurality opinion) ("In saying that gender played a motivating
part in an employment decision, we mean that, if we asked the employer at the moment of
the decision what its reasons were and if we received a truthful response, one of those
reasons would be that the applicant or employee was a woman.").
729
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
motivating part in an employment decision."s0 Prejudice against a group that is
defined by its defiance of a stereotype should be legally distinguished from
prejudice against a group because ofits defiance of that stereotype.
The law of "bona fide occupational qualifications" (BFOQs) under Title
VIs' involves a similar distinction. We permit discrimination against women,
as a group, when the employer's reasons for discriminating are "reasonably
necessary to the normal operation of that particular business or enterprise.""
Thus, even where discrimination against the targeted group is generally
impermissible, the action is nonetheless legal where there is a permissible
reason for discrimination. Because homosexuality is a category defined by sex,
all forms of prejudice against homosexuality will rely on sex to define their
target. However, not all forms of prejudice against homosexuality will arise
because the discriminator wishes to punish gender-nonconformity. And
because Price Waterhouse's protections extend only to gender-nonconformity,
other reasons to discriminate against homosexuality, though perhaps morally
repugnant, are, like BFOQs, legal.
Employers who punish bi/homosexuality are not necessarily punishing
gender-nonconformity. For example, they might instead be expressing their
devotion to religious teachings.s" The AIDS panic contributes additional very
plausible possibilities: fear of perceived uncleanliness or condemnation of
perceived promiscuity." With other sources of prejudice against
bi/homosexuality on the table, a court need not simply assume in all cases that
the hostile sentiment has arisen from stereotypes about the sex of the people
that men and women should be attracted to. Instead, a court may engage in
the same sorts of credibility determinations that disparate-treatment law has
always required: judging whether defendants are being honest when they
claim that, although race or sex could have motivated their decisions, it
did not.
This reformulation of the issues would address the Price Waterhouse
dilemma because judges could simultaneously vindicate the values of Price
50. Id.
51. 42 U.S.C. § 200oe-2(e)(1) (2006).
S2. Id.
5. See, e.g., Bernard E. Whitley Jr., Religiosity and Attitudes Toward Lesbians and Gay
Men: A Meta-Analysis, 19 INT'L J. FOR PSYCHOL. RELIGION 21 (2009); Frank Newport,
Religion Big Factor for Americans Against Same-Sex Marriage, GALLUP (Dec. 5,
2012), http://www.gallup.com/poIl/159089/religion-major-factor-americans-opposed
-sex-marriage.aspx.
s4. See Schultz, supra note 12, at 1787 n.533.
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Waterhouse and avoid making a categorical, quasi-legislative pronouncement
on the legal status of sexual-orientation discrimination. Sexual-orientation
discrimination would only receive partial protection, conditional on showing
that an employer's prejudice against bi/homosexuality was "motivated" at least
in part by gender stereotypes. The employer could then either dispute that
evidence altogether or raise the partial affirmative defense that it would have
made the same decision due to other lawful factors, including gender-
indifferent sources of prejudice against bi/homosexuality.
One rejoinder is that purportedly gender-indifferent sources of prejudice
against bi/homosexuality only arise as an indirect way of expressing
disapproval of gender violations. Indeed, there are deep questions about
precisely what mental state should be labeled as "motivation," to which we can
provide no easy answer.ss Worse still, in some cases, purportedly gender-
indifferent reasons to discriminate may be nothing more than a pretext like any
other-a knowing attempt to conceal motives and deceive the court. Employers
keen on continuing to discriminate against bi/homosexual employees could
potentially evade liability by ensuring that any workplace expressions of
prejudice against bi/homosexuality make reference principally to gender-
indifferent sources of prejudice.
But these difficulties are common to any area of antidiscrimination law,
which must operate in a world in which thought processes are shrouded, often
deliberately. Courts can decide for themselves precisely what qualifies as
"motivation," and plaintiffs still have an opportunity to convince courts that
the proffered gender-indifferent basis for the prejudice was pretextual.ss
Additionally, incentivizing employers to eliminate gender-motivated pejorative
55. Using religious motivation as an example, the law might want to distinguish between (1) a
religious woman who discriminates because she blindly accepts her church's prohibition on
homosexuality as the will of God, (2) the same woman who accepts her church's prohibition
but also believes that the prohibition is based on gender norms, (3) a woman who, on her
own, disapproves of homosexuality's gender-nonconformity but has convinced herself that
her religiosity is the source of those beliefs, and (4) a woman who knowingly uses religion
as a way to conceal the fact that she dislikes homosexuality because of its gender-
nonconformity. Cf Linda Hamilton Krieger, The Content of Our Categories: A Cognitive Bias
Approach to Discrimination and Equal Employment Opportunity, 47 STAN. L. REV. 1161 (1995)
(arguing that discrimination law should take into account implicit biases, in contrast to
current doctrine); Amy L. Wax, Discrimination as Accident, 74 IND. L.J. 1129, 1147 (1999)
(arguing that McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973), which laid out burdens
of proof in disparate-treatment cases, presumes that an employer's motivations "are
transparent to him" because the very idea that an employer's stated rationale may be a
"pretext" entails the employer's knowing what his "real" motivations were).
56. See McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 804.
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language from the workplace would seem to serve the broad gender-equality
goals invoked by Price Waterhouse," even when it leaves a particular
bi/homosexual plaintiff without legal recourse. Indeed, that fact highlights
how this proposal is different in kind from a proposal to simply add sexual-
orientation discrimination to Title VII by judicial decree.
The dismissal and summary judgment phases of litigation are where the
distinction between gender-motivated and gender-indifferent prejudice against
bi/homosexuality could have its greatest practical impact. A motion to dismiss
for failure to state a claim would require a court to decide whether it is facially
plausible that an employer's prejudice against an employee's homosexuality
was gender-motivated.5 Later in litigation, a summary judgment motion
would require a court to decide whether there is a "genuine issue of material
fact" as to whether gender stereotypes motivated the employer's prejudice
against the plaintiffs bi/homosexuality. 9 In many cases, the specific facts and
circumstances brought out in the pleadings and during discovery may answer
these questions decisively. But where the facts provide little guidance, the court
might want to know how plausible gender-motivated prejudice against
bi/homosexuality is in the abstract, relative to gender-indifferent prejudice
against bi/homosexuality.
Here, social science could influence the outcomes. Social science could
inform judges' own personal intuitions about the likelihood that prejudice
against bi/homosexuality- that is, prejudice against the fact of
bi/homosexuality itself-is gender-motivated. Moreover, if plaintiffs could
introduce social science evidence in the summary judgment process, they could
perhaps shift those intuitions."0 If that happened, a greater proportion of cases
could survive summary judgment and progress towards trial. Knowing that,
57. See Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 251 (1989) (plurality opinion) ("Congress
intended to strike at the entire spectrum of disparate treatment of men and women resulting
from sex stereotypes.").
58. See FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6); see also Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678-79 (2009)
(explaining that to survive a motion to dismiss, parties must allege facts that make out a
claim that is plausible on its face).
59. FED. R. CIV. P. 56.
6o. Several scholars have advocated a greater role for social science evidence in
antidiscrimination law. See, e.g., Linda Hamilton Krieger & Susan T. Fiske, Behavioral
Realism in Employment Discrimination Law: Implicit Bias and Disparate Treatment, 94 CALIF.
L. REv. 997, 1o61 (20o6); Charles A. Sullivan, Plausibly Pleading Employment Discrimination,
52 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1613, 1677 (2011) (suggesting "pleading social science studies
documenting the pervasiveness of discrimination in American society"); Thomas F. Kondro,
Comment, Mixed Motives and Motivating Factors: Choosing a Realistic Summary Judgment
Framework for 5 2oooe-2(m) of Title VII, 54 ST. Louis U. L.J. 1439, 1464 (2010).
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and often wishing to avoid the expense and exposure of a trial, employers
would be inclined to avoid discriminating against bi/homosexual employees for
any reason.
Social science studies offer a method of exploring and demonstrating the
abstract plausibility of gender-motivated prejudice against bi/homosexuality.
Current empirical evidence is suggestive of gender-motivated prejudice against
homosexuality, but not conclusive on the matter. We already know that a
certain baseline level of prejudice exists towards otherwise gender-conforming
homosexuals.6 ' And there is evidence that people are perceived as less gender-
conforming when they are labeled as homosexual, compared to when they are
not labeled as homosexual.
What we do not know is whether the latter (gendered judgments about
homosexuality in isolation) causes the former (prejudice towards
homosexuality in isolation). That is, if we ignore other markers of gender-
nonconformity (e.g., high-pitched voice) and look just at the mere fact of a
person's homosexuality, is there still prejudice that is motivated by the idea
that homosexuality is gender-nonconforming? Alternatively, if we described a
fictional man as gay or bisexual, but changed nothing else about him, would
other people like him less than they would have otherwise because of what the
additional information suggests about his gender-conformity? Ordinarily, we
could test this question by lowering the fictional man's gender-conformity and
then measuring the change in people's attitudes. If people liked him less (or
more) as a result, we could infer that there was a causal relationship between
his gender-conformity and how well he was liked.
For our purposes, the ideal case would be to manipulate the
masculinity/femininity of bi/homosexuality itself It is hard to imagine what
this would look like, however, other than presenting different fictional
characters, for example, at various points along the Kinsey Scale.6 ' The
difficulty with such a setup is that the characters might be perceived as
belonging to entirely different communities, rather than merely differing in the
masculinity/femininity of their sexual attractions. For example, rather than
drawing on gender stereotypes, we might end up drawing increasingly on
61. See supra note 39 and accompanying text.
6z. See Aaron J. Blashill & Kimberly K. Powlishta, Gay Stereotypes: The Use of Sexual Orientation
as a Cue for Gender-Related Attributes, 61 SEx RoLES 783 (2009); Mitchell & Ellis, supra note
39, at 90 ("[W]hen Ike was labeled gay, he was rated as less masculine ... and more
feminine ... than when he was labeled adopted.").
63. See Kinsey's Heterosexual-Homosexual Rating Scale, KINSEY INST., http://www.kinseyinstitute
.org/research/ak-hhscale.html (last visited Apr. 19, 2012).
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stereotypes about and prejudice towards bisexuals, particularly the perception
of bisexuals as promiscuous and untrustworthy or confused."'
One alternative is simply to manipulate nonsexual traits: a person's voice,
mannerisms, personality, etc. As we have seen, it is already fairly clear that
manipulating these nonsexual markers of gender-conformity does indeed
change people's opinions of gay people. 6s Then, knowing that people's
prejudice responds to nonsexual markers of gender-conformity, one might
infer that prejudice also must respond to sexual markers of gender-conformity.
But the rival theory would be that sexuality is different, that the sexual and the
nonsexual might be conceptually distinct in people's minds. People who readily
create and police a mental gender spectrum for nonsexual behaviors might fail
to do so for sexual behaviors because, for example, sexuality exists in such a
private sphere.
Our study of attitudes towards penetrative preferences, which are of course
sexual descriptors, has allowed us to draw a closer analogy to attitudes towards
bi/homosexuality. This, in turn, has allowed us to make some progress on our
fundamental question of the extent to which prejudice against
bi/homosexuality responds to changes in perceived gender. By making
comparisons only among attitudes towards each of the three penetrative
preferences, we have been able to control for the baseline amount of prejudice
against bi/homosexuality that might be attributable to other, gender-
indifferent factors. To the extent that each penetrative preference is viewed as
more or less gender-conforming, attitudinal differences brought about by each
preference would then suggest something about the general population's
tendency to judge sexuality according to its gender-conformity. In other
words, if we can make people dislike gay characters more by adding a
dimension of sexuality that is perceived as gender-nonconforming, we need
not reach far to infer that these people are also basing their dislike of
bi/homosexuality, at least in part, on its gender-nonconformity.
This preliminary study of attitudes towards penetrative preferences was not
designed in a way that can definitively demonstrate that prejudice towards
sexuality is gender-motivated. One recent small-scale study found that
respondents were able to guess gay men's penetrative preferences from facial
64. See Gregory M. Herek, Heterosexuals'Attitudes Toward Bisexual Men and Women in the United
States, 39 J. SEX RES. 264 (2002); Leah R. Spalding & Letitia Anne Peplau, The Unfaithful
Lover: Heterosexuals' Perceptions of Bisexuals and Their Relationships, 21 PSYCHOL. WOMEN Q.
611 (1997); Kenji Yoshino, The Epistemic Contract of Bisexual Erasure, 52 STAN. L. REV. 353,
420-28 (2000).
65. See supra note 38 and accompanying text.
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clues, and that the effect was mediated through the respondents' judgments of
the faces' masculinity.66 But we have not probed the thought processes of
respondents in order to uncover the actual subjective basis for their manifested
prejudice. Indeed, future research into public attitudes towards gender and
sexuality should endeavor to do so. What we can say, however, is that our
results were suggestive of the idea that people do evaluate an individual's
sexuality based on how gender-conforming it seems, beyond looking at the
biological sex of that individual's partner. In addition to aspects of our results
that support such a conclusion, which we will discuss, the cultural history of
penetrative preferences themselves is suggestive of that idea.
Unlike sexual orientation categories, penetrative preferences do not seem
to have acquired crystallized public narratives that could introduce strong
confounding associations like those related to bisexuality. Despite the seeming
cultural fascination with penetration, there is no evidence that heterosexuals
understand people with different penetrative preferences as comprising
separate subcommunities with distinct identities. Although gay men adopt
these labels as fairly concrete identities6' and regularly communicate them to
potential romantic matches, there is little scholarship on this topic, and none
that we could find dealing with how these preferences are viewed by outsiders
to the LGBT community.69 Within the popular media, we are unaware of
significant mainstream discussion of penetrative preference identities outside
of the LGBT community. Moreover, heterosexuals presently have little reason
or opportunity to discuss penetrative preferences as identities distinct from
sexual orientation, because heterosexuality carries with it a strong presumption
that the male will be the penetrator.
Gender associations with penetrative preferences, on the other hand, could
be formed on the spot and thereby impact people's impressions. Penetrative
preferences are readily gendered. At various points in history, a man's
perceived masculinity has been tied to whether he penetrated or was
penetrated. 70 Certainly within modern gay communities, bottom is perceived
66. Konstantin 0. Tskhay & Nicholas 0. Rule, Accurate Identification of a Preference for Insertive
Versus Receptive Intercourse from Static Facial Cues of Gay Men, 42 ARCHIVES SEXUAL BEHAV.
1217 (2013).
67. See Moskowitz et al., supra note 3; Wei & Raymond, supra note 3.
68. See Goodlin-Fahncke & Dial, supra note 3.
6g. There is of course a fair amount of literature documenting gay sexuality, including
penetrative preferences. See supra notes 3-5. None of these sources, however, documents the
heterosexual public's attitudes towards penetrative preferences.
70. See supra note 2.
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as the most "feminine" penetrative preference and top as the most
"masculine." 7 Moreover, on a conceptual level, tops fit expectations of the
masculine gender better than bottoms. To the extent that the archetypal male is
heterosexual, he is also exclusively - or at least primarily-a penetrator, if only
because of the cultural importance placed on the complementarity of male and
female anatomy.
We do not wish to make assumptions about the appropriate gender
classification of any particular penetrative preference and thereby to reify the
very stereotypes that we are seeking to uncover. Rather, our project is to
theorize the ways in which gender norms could possibly be influencing
society's views towards sexuality. One possibility is that gender norms might
lead respondents to favor gay men who are penetrators, in accordance with
stereotypes about the roles that men must play. There is, however, also reason
to believe that bottoms might be favored because they would fulfill a stereotype
that people who are attracted to men -whether women or men themselves -
enjoy being penetrated. Finally, we could imagine a scenario in which versatile
men would be most disfavored, as they occupy an intermediate gender status,
much like bisexual and transgender people." Any of these results, however,
would be consistent with a world in which gender-conformity affects the
degree of aversion to particular sexual practices.
We have also been able to explore whether there are variables that can
explain why prejudice against certain penetrative preferences is more prevalent
in some circumstances than in others. If such variation exists, it would accord
with a world in which some cases of prejudice against bi/homosexuality are
gender-motivated to a greater degree than others. We have looked at two
possible sources of variation: demographics and setting. On the basis of these
data, we will consider whether certain subgroups of respondents are more or
less likely than others, on average, to display gender-motivated prejudice. And
we will consider whether the larger factual setting in which the penetrative
preferences are presented changes the average person's tendency to be
prejudiced against a certain preference.
i. See supra notes 3-5 and accompanying text.
72. See Aaron T. Norton & Gregory M. Herek, Heterosexuals' Attitudes Toward Transgender
People: Findings from a National Probability Sample of U.S. Adults, 68 SEx RoLES 738, 738
(2012); supra note 64 and accompanying text; infra Section III.B.
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II. A PRELIMINARY STUDY OF ATTITUDES TOWARDS PENETRATIVE
PREFERENCES
A. Methods
Our study explored public attitudes through the use of online survey forms
with an experimental design. Respondents were recruited through the eLab at
the Yale School of Management, an online referral service that advertises the
potential for participants to win small prizes for participation in various
external surveys. Participants in our study (n = 949) were directed to an online
survey hosted by Qualtrics, a data collection service, and told they would
have a one-in-twenty-five chance of winning a twenty-five dollar Amazon.com
gift card.
Once they entered the survey, respondents were asked to respond to a
series of questions concerning a character named Tom, as well as a series of
questions concerning characters named Laurie and Ron." Subjects were
presented at random with one of four descriptions of Tom: the vignette either
said he was a top, said he was a bottom, or said he was versatile-and described
what those labels meant-or else left his penetrative preference unspecified.
Comparisons made among the four versions of the Tom vignette are therefore
made among four randomly assigned pools of respondents. Similarly, subjects
were presented at random with one of four different versions of Laurie and
Ron: Ron as a penetrator with "masculine" interests, Ron as penetrator with
"feminine" interests, Laurie as penetrator with "feminine" interests, and Laurie
as penetrator with "masculine" interests.
We should clarify that, in describing these characters or situations as more
"feminine" or "masculine," we are referring only to how they may be seen by
respondents. In relying on stereotypically female or male descriptors, we
sought only to report on the potential ways in which these descriptors could
impact respondents' attitudes by calling to mind potential cultural associations.
We do not endorse these associations ourselves or believe that any particular
set of interests should be viewed as masculine or feminine.
In all versions of the Tom vignette, Tom was described in the following
way:
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Tom is a doctor living and working in a moderately sized city on the
East Coast. He was raised in the South and still loves to barbecue when
he gets the chance. He keeps his apartment as clean as possible,
especially when he invites his friends over for cocktails. Tom is gay and
single. Sometimes he'll invite someone he's dating home, and if things
go well, they'll end up having anal sex.
The purpose in describing Tom this way was to mix what could have been seen
by respondents as "masculine" or rugged traits (being a doctor, being from the
South, enjoying barbecuing) with what they might see as "feminine" or refined
traits (living in a large East Coast city, being tidy, enjoying cocktails), so that
respondents would be conflicted about how to characterize Tom's gender.
Thus, when we mentioned his penetrative preference, we might be able to tip
the scales one way or the other.
The three versions in which Tom's penetrative preference was mentioned
differed only with regard to one of the following final sentences: (i) "Tom
considers himself a 'top' in the bedroom, which means he really likes to
penetrate the other guy anally, but he doesn't enjoy being penetrated by the
other guy." (2) "Tom considers himself 'versatile' in the bedroom, which
means he equally enjoys penetrating the other guy anally and being penetrated
by the other guy." (3) "Tom considers himself a 'bottom' in the bedroom,
which means he really likes being penetrated anally by the other guy, but he
doesn't enjoy penetrating the other guy."
For each of the four versions of the Tom vignette, we asked respondents
the following questions, in random order: (1) "If Tom invited you to go to a
barbecue festival with him, would you go?" (2) "If Tom invited you over for
cocktails with some of your mutual friends, would you go?" (3) "Do you think
Tom would ordinarily 'pass' as a straight man in a social situation?" There
were six possible responses: Unlikely, At Least Somewhat Unlikely, Only
Slightly Unlikely, Only Slightly Likely, At Least Somewhat Likely, and Likely.
The first two questions were selected as proxies for prejudice, in place of a
more direct question about how much respondents liked Tom. We did this in
order to mitigate the effect of putting respondents on the spot about
potentially controversial judgments, and thereby to avoid social-desirability
bias.74 With the third question, we sought to measure the respondents'
74. See, e.g., Robert J. Fisher & James E. Katz, Social-Desirability Bias and the Validity of Self-
Reported Values, 17 PSYCHOL. & MARKETING 105, 1o6, 115 (2000) (documenting that an
interest in self-presentation and positive feedback can lead respondents to self-report values
believed to be socially desirable, particularly when those values are perceived by respondents
to be strongly prescribed within the social system).
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tendency to engage in stereotyping of gay men, even if those stereotypes did
not translate into prejudice in the first two questions.
The purpose in asking about both the barbecue festival and the cocktail
party was to see whether respondents' aversion to a particular penetrative
preference might be muted or magnified by the setting in which they were
asked to accompany Tom. One possibility was that respondents might view
being invited to someone's house for cocktails as more intimate and "feminine"
than being asked to a public event with traditionally rugged, "masculine"
associations, which might make certain penetrative preferences more or less
threatening to particular respondents. 7s
For the Laurie and Ron vignette, the description was as follows:
<Laurie/Ron> is an investment banker at a large firm in New York
City. <Her husband/His wife> <Ron/Laurie> is a nurse in the suburb
where they live. <Laurie/Ron> is a huge Yankees fan but seldom has
time to go see a game. It's a good thing <she/he> married
<Ron/Laurie>, because <Laurie/Ron> has no idea how to keep up a
household. They have a pretty conventional marriage, but sometimes
<Laurie/Ron> likes to use sex toys to stimulate and penetrate
<Ron/Laurie> anally, which <Ron/Laurie> also enjoys. They haven't
decided yet whether or not to have kids, but they love each other very
much.
The four versions differed with respect to the marked fields. In two
versions, the interests-related fields had Laurie as the investment banker who
enjoys sports and is married to a nurse who keeps up the household; the other
two had Ron in that role. Then, for each of those two versions, the sex-related
fields had either Laurie or Ron as the penetrator and the other person as the
penetrated.
For each of the four versions of the Laurie and Ron vignette, we asked
respondents the following questions, in random order: (1) "Are Ron and
Laurie a couple you can see yourself being friends with?" (2) "How likely do
you think it is that Ron has occasional homosexual desires?" (3) "How likely
do you think it is that Laurie has occasional homosexual desires?" There were
six possible responses: Unlikely, At Least Somewhat Unlikely, Only Slightly
Unlikely, Only Slightly Likely, At Least Somewhat Likely, and Likely.
75. We also recognize, however, the countervailing possibility that accompanying Tom to the
barbecue festival might make certain penetrative preferences seem more threatening,
because it could come across as more of a one-on-one "date" than the invitation to drink
cocktails with mutual friends.
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After they completed the questions concerning these vignettes, respondents
continued to a demographic survey of sex, age, sexual orientation, gender
identity, race, Hispanic ethnicity, time spent in the United States, and highest
level of educational attainment. Finally, respondents were asked to estimate
what proportion of gay men are tops, bottoms, or versatiles.
B. Results
Our sample of eLab respondents, described in Table 1, was fairly diverse
but not entirely representative of the broader population. After excluding the
121 respondents who identified as LGBT, we were left with 828 respondents.
Of those, 523 were female and 305 were male. The average respondent's age
was 37.3 years, with a standard deviation of 15-3. Among respondents, 6%
identified as Hispanic or Latino and 24% identified as having a non-white
racial background. Ninety percent of respondents said they had spent the
majority of their lives in the United States. For educational attainment, io%
had never attended college, 31% had attended some college, 29% were college
graduates, and 31% had attended at least some graduate school. Particularly in
light of the high level of educational attainment, we suspect that our results
might be biased in favor of greater tolerance for gender violations.
Using a two-sided Mann-Whitney test for statistical significance, we made
pair-wise comparisons of answers among the different versions of each
vignette.76 We compared unspecified-Tom to top-Tom, bottom-Tom, and
versatile-Tom across all three questions. We also compared top-, bottom-, and
versatile-Tom to one another. Then we compared all versions of the Laurie and
Ron vignette to one another across all three questions. Full p-values for these
tests are listed in Tables 2-7. One, two, or three asterisks following the p-values
denote where we found, respectively, weak (a = o.io), ordinary (a = o.o5), or
strong (a = o.oi) statistical significance.
Regarding respondents' willingness to go to a barbecue festival with Tom,
presented in Table 2, we saw only one strongly significant effect: people were
significantly less likely to go to a barbecue festival with Tom when Tom was
described as versatile, as compared to when Tom's penetrative preference was
unspecified (p = 0.003). But there was also a weakly significant tendency to
disfavor bottom-Tom in comparison to unspecified-Tom (p = 0.077), as well
76. Our response scale (six options, ranging from Likely to Unlikely) did not necessarily create
even intervals between responses, and therefore nonparametric methods such as Mann-
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as a weakly significant tendency to favor top-Tom over versatile-Tom (p =
o.o66). Comparing the means for each response (computed for illustrative, but
not inferential, purposes),' Table 2 also shows an overall pattern of feeling
most comfortable with unspecified-Tom, followed by top-Tom, then bottom-
Tom, then versatile-Tom.
Results for the cocktail party question, reported in Table 3, also display the
same ordinal ranking of means, with respondents most likely to attend with
unspecified-Tom, followed by top-Tom, then bottom-Tom, then versatile-
Tom. However, the gap between unspecified-Tom and all the other Toms
widened. Additionally, respondents were significantly more likely to go to the
cocktail party with unspecified-Tom than with versatile-Tom (p = o.oo) or
bottom-Tom (p = 0.008). Most notably, we even saw a statistically significant
difference between versatile-Tom and top-Tom (p = 0.046).
Finally, Table 4 reports on the ability of the various Toms to pass as
straight. Again, we saw the same ordinal ranking of means, with the
unspecified-Tom being most likely to pass, followed in descending likelihood
by top-Tom, bottom-Tom, and versatile-Tom. Top-Tom, bottom-Tom, and
versatile-Tom were all significantly less likely to be perceived as "passable"
than unspecified-Tom, but the differentials between the three specified groups
were smaller and not statistically significant. Although mentioning penetrative
preference amplified how "gay" Tom was perceived to be, no particular role in
anal sex was considered "gayer" than another.
Next, we considered whether subgroups of our study population differed
in their prejudices towards specific versions of Tom. Based on earlier studies
that have shown men and women to react differently to homosexuality and
gender-nonconformity," we decided to control for respondents' biological sex.
Second, based on surveys showing generational shifts in attitudes towards
homosexuality, we also sorted our study population into two age clusters,
roughly at its median: those at least thirty-three years old and those thirty-two
years old or younger.79 We then performed Mann-Whitney significance tests,
like those performed on the entire study population, for each of the three
subgroups. Results are presented in Tables 2a-2d (for the barbecue setting)
and Tables 3a-3d (for the cocktail setting).
77. See supra note 76 (explaining why it is inappropriate to use parametric methods for
inferential purposes).
78. See, e.g., Lisa LaMar & Mary Kite, Sex Diferences in Attitudes Toward Gay Men and Lesbians:
AMultidimensional Perspective, 35 J. SEX RES. 189 (1998).
79. See, e.g., Mary E. Kite, (Some) Things Are Diferent Now: An Optimistic Look at Sexual
Prejudice, 35 PSYCHOL. WOMEN Q_.517, 518 (2011).
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For the barbecue setting, we saw no significant results in any of the
subgroups. Three of the subgroups -younger men (Table 2a), younger women
(Table 2b), and older men (Table 2c) -did, however, display the same ordinal
ranking as before: top-Tom, followed by bottom-Tom, followed by versatile-
Tom. Older women (Table 2d) did not, instead favoring bottom-Tom ahead of
top-Tom, though not at a statistically significant level. Although Tables 2a-2c
show a fairly large gap between top-Tom and versatile-Tom, replicating what
we saw in the overall study population, the difference was not statistically
significant-perhaps because of the much smaller sample size.
For the cocktail setting, we did see significant results. Younger men (Table
3a) and younger women (Table 3b) again favored top-Tom over versatile-Tom.
Like those two groups, older men (Table 3c) also had the highest mean ranking
for top-Tom, followed by bottom-Tom, and then versatile-Tom. Because of
the distribution of the responses, however, the Mann-Whitney test registered
statistical significance for the top-bottom difference but not the top-versatile
difference."o Older women (Table 3d), by contrast, showed no statistically
significant tendency to favor one penetrative preference more than the others
and did not follow the same ordering of the means seen in all three of the
other groups.
Overall, the Tom vignette points to prejudice against certain penetrative
preferences. In several instances, both within the full study population and
within certain subgroups, respondents favored top-Tom over versatile-Tom.
Then there is the disfavoring of bottom-Tom by older men. Both of these
results are bolstered by the fact that both versatile-Tom and bottom-Tom, but
not top-Tom, elicited a significantly less favorable reaction than the baseline
set by unspecified-Tom. Additionally, there is the overall trend in computed
means, placing top-Tom first, versatile-Tom last, and bottom-Tom in the
middle, which is of no statistical significance in isolation but which was very
persistent across nearly all the comparisons we made.
The results also seem to suggest that prejudice against certain penetrative
so. The Mann-Whitney test considers median responses, rather than mean responses, and
thereby allows comparisons to be made even when data are non-interval and/or non-
normal. In this particular instance, respondents had a tendency to rate versatile-Tom either
high or low on the scale, whereas bottom-Tom had more responses in the middle ranges. As
a result, it was possible for the bottom-Tom group to have a slightly lower median than the
versatile-Tom group, even though the means were in the opposite order. Although the
Mann-Whitney test is more appropriate for our data than a comparison of the means, the
difference between top-Tom and versatile-Tom would be statistically significant when
comparing the means (Student's t, p = 0.026), as would the difference between top-Tom
and bottom-Tom (p = 0.031).
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preferences is variable. It is true that changing the setting did not change the
result within the entire study population: a tendency to favor top-Tom over
versatile-Tom. But that tendency was stronger in the cocktail party setting.
Moreover, after we separated the population into subgroups, we found several
significant biases among the subgroups on the cocktail party question, whereas
we found no biases with the barbecue question. Additionally, we found real
differences among the subgroups in the cocktail party setting. In particular,
we found that older women did not display the tendency (found among
younger men and women and older men) to favor one penetrative preference
over another.
We should emphasize that this finding does not mean that older women
are less likely to discriminate against homosexuality, nor does it mean that
younger women are equally likely to discriminate against homosexuality as
younger men. Indeed, Tables 2a-2d and 3a-3d show a higher average rating
among younger women than among younger men across all versions of Tom.
The relative ratings of each version of Tom, however, suggest that young
women nonetheless tended to have gender on the mind when evaluating sexual
practices. We therefore might reasonably expect that, among young women
who do have an overall negative view of homosexuality, some of that negativity
arises from gender norms. The results among older women, meanwhile, show
that certain contextual factors, such as the age of the discriminator, can make
that less likely.
Regarding Laurie and Ron, we did see some tendency in the data to favor
as friends the versions of the couple that had Ron as the penetrator (Table 5).
That tendency was not, however, statistically significant. That is not especially
surprising, given that the question ("Are Ron and Laurie a couple you can see
yourself being friends with?") was more direct than the questions we asked
about Tom's likability, and therefore more likely to bring about social-
desirability bias. Also, the fact that respondents were presented with a question
about Laurie and Ron's joint likability as a couple differentiates this scenario
further from the Tom vignette. Accordingly, the Laurie and Ron results are not
substantially in conflict with the Tom results.
Particularly remarkable were the questions about Laurie and Ron's latent
homosexuality (Tables 6-7). Respondents were overwhelmingly more likely to
think that both Ron (Table 6) and Laurie (Table 7) had "occasional homosexual
desires" when Laurie was the penetrator. Every single pair-wise comparison
between Ron-as-penetrator and Laurie-as-penetrator had a strongly significant
p-value (p < o.oi) for both questions.
First of all, these results rule out the possibility that penetrative preferences
are only culturally relevant in the typical homosexual context. Although the
effect on actual prejudice was not statistically significant when measured by the
first question, the latter questions show that penetrative preferences had an
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effect on our respondents' perceptions even in the context of a heterosexual
relationship. Laurie and Ron were described as a loving couple contemplating
whether to have children, but respondents were persuaded that both Laurie
and Ron were more likely to have homosexual desires merely because of the
roles they played in bed. By comparison, respondents overall had almost no
response to the differences in Ron and Laurie's professions and interests.
These results do not directly demonstrate that penetrative preferences were
gendered in our respondents' minds, but they are suggestive of that
conclusion. On a formal level - bracketing for a moment the question of
respondents' actual beliefs - these results do show that penetrative preferences
are gendered to some extent. They are formally gendered because there is an
interaction taking place between penetrative preferences and biological sex.
Mentioning anal sex and sex toys might have had some baseline effect, but
there was an additional effect that occurred only when the woman was the
penetrator (or the man was the penetrated). This disparity strongly suggests
that there was an expectation that the man would penetrate and the woman
would be penetrated.
Saying that some cultural expectation was disrupted does not, however, tell
us the precise ways in which the respondents' views of Laurie and Ron
changed when that expectation was disrupted. If we conducted this study again
with the benefit of hindsight, we would ask direct questions about gender-
conformity. At least in theory, respondents could have thought that a
penetrating woman and penetrated man were just "gayer" than their
counterparts with reversed roles, without actually believing that one possibility
was more gender-nonconforming per se. But homosexuality and gender are
culturally associated: people tend to think that gender-nonconforming people
are gay"' and that gay people are gender-nonconforming." It therefore seems
likely that, in associating Laurie-as-penetrator with homosexuality,
respondents also associated it with some degree of gender-nonconformity.
Our final survey questions asked respondents to estimate the percentages
of tops, bottoms, and versatiles among gay men, presented in Table 8. The
average estimates for tops, bottoms, and versatiles were 31.5%, 27.9%, and
40.6%, respectively. Thus, the average heterosexual person believes that more
than two-thirds of gay men are either bottoms or versatiles. And if they view
81. See McCreary, supra note 7, at 526 ("For male [targets], being presented in a female-valued
fashion resulted in a significantly stronger perception of being or becoming a homosexual
. . . ."); Gerulf Rieger et al., Dissecting "Gaydar": Accuracy and the Role of Masculinity-
Femininity, 39 ARCHIVES SExuAL BEHAV. 124 (2010).
82. See Blashill & Powlishta, supra note 62; Mitchell & Ellis, supra note 39.
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both of those as gender-nonconforming preferences, then it further supports
the notion that an employer might assume, even without knowing an
employee's penetrative preference, that a gay employee is "feminine" in the
bedroom and therefore discriminate against him.
While the true proportion of these groups is only imprecisely known, the
handfuil of published estimates range from 19-20% for tops, 26-35% for
bottoms, and 47-54% for versatiles, among the gay male population. On
average, therefore, our heterosexual respondents did correctly intuit that
versatiles are most common, but tended to underestimate their prevalence in
the population. More importantly, heterosexuals failed to perceive that there
are likely to be more bottoms than tops in the population. Analyzing the
proportion of respondent estimates falling outside the most credible prevalence
ranges, which we have adopted as a reference point, we found that while only
9% of respondents underestimated the number of tops, a whopping 79%
overestimated. For bottoms, 51% underestimated and 21% overestimated. And
for versatiles, s8% underestimated and 18% overestimated.
Next, we ran an ordinary least squares regression to see whether there was
a priming effect created by the vignettes themselves. For this regression, we
included variables for the other non-Tom-related vignettes not discussed in
this paper. Given the randomization of the vignettes, did seeing more or fewer
tops/bottoms/versatiles in the vignettes make these types more salient in ways
that impacted respondents' estimates of the prevalence percentages? Table 9
provides some modest evidence of a priming effect by reporting that an
increasing number of bottom vignettes caused respondents to lower their
estimates for the percentage of tops.
III. DISCUSSION
A. Revisiting the Price Waterhouse Dilemma
Our preliminary study of heterosexuals' attitudes towards penetrative
preferences has allowed us to suggest two modifications to the premises
underlying the current understanding of the dilemma between Price
Waterhouse's principles and judicial deference to Congress: (1) There are real
forms of gender-motivated prejudice against a person's sexuality that are
distinct from prejudice against having actual or desired partners of the same
sex. (2) With regard to prejudice against the sex of someone's partners, it is
83. See Moskowitz et al., supra note 3, at 192, 194.
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quite plausible that such prejudice is gender-motivated, but that is not a
foregone conclusion. Both of these possibilities would allow courts to extend
antidiscrimination protections-at least through the summary judgment
phase - to a broader class of plaintiffs who are discriminated against because of
their sexuality, without categorically covering homosexuality. Although our
study was not designed to answer every question raised by those proposed
modifications, the results do shed light on many of those questions.
What is perhaps most striking about the results is the mere fact that
penetrative preference made any significant differences in attitudes whatsoever.
Penetrative preference was not some irrelevant detail that added noise to the
data. For both the Tom and the Laurie-and-Ron vignettes, people responded
differently when the characters played a different role in anal sex. Although it
would not be particularly surprising to find that mentioning anal sex colored
respondents' reactions, it is entirely different to see reactions that vary
according to the particular role in anal sex being described.
Penetrative preference therefore stands as an example of a dimension of
sexuality, aside from the sex of one's partners, that might plausibly have a real
effect on prejudice.1 Indeed, it might have an impact even when employers do
not know gay employees' penetrative preferences, because people may hold
opinions about the general prevalence of each preference and tend to assume
that gay men are sexually "feminine" unless there are indications to the
contrary. Respondents' disparate responses could not be explained by certain
gender-indifferent prejudices (e.g., "My religious tenet is that all men who
engage in anal sex are sinful."), but we did not directly prove that respondents
contemplated penetrative preferences in gendered terms. Still, we believe that
the results are consistent with and suggestive of that conclusion. There is
indeed an opportunity for further research into the actual thought processes
underlying prejudice against various dimensions of sexuality.
To the extent that penetrative preferences are subjectively gendered, the
tendency to favor tops and disfavor versatiles also speaks to the broader
likelihood that prejudice towards bi/homosexuality itself is gender-motivated.
This insight joins existing social psychology research in demonstrating a
connection between prejudice and the manipulation of potentially gender-
salient traits, but it does so by manipulating a distinctly sexual trait. We also
84. Aside from penetrative preferences, one could imagine, for example, a person being
discriminated against because an employer finds out about a particular fetish, fantasy, or
role-playing identity that the employer believes to be inappropriately masculine or feminine.
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saw, however, that this likely relationship between sexual gender-conformity
and prejudice was not constant or inevitable. In several instances, contextual
variables made prejudice against a particular penetrative preference less likely.
A different setting (barbecue festival versus cocktail party) seemed to attenuate
signs of prejudice. Additionally, older men had a different prejudice than
younger men, and older women did not show any prejudice at all with regard
to penetrative preferences.
Together, these results suggest that courts can and should interpret Price
Waterhouse in a way that covers a broader range of bi/homosexual plaintiffs,
including those who lack prominent outward gender-nonconformity. Courts
should be open to claims about discrimination on the basis of dimensions of
sexuality that are distinct from sexual orientation, such as penetrative
preferences. And even with regard to sexual orientation, courts could expand
Price Waterhouse to cover only those situations where prejudice against
bi/homosexuality was gender-motivated. By making individualized
determinations and interrogating the actual source of employers' motivations,
as courts do elsewhere in their antidiscrimination dockets, they could still avoid
providing blanket coverage to all claims of sexual-orientation discrimination.
B. Further Legal Implications Arising from Versatility
That a versatile person, and not a top or bottom, was most often disfavored
adds another layer to our analysis. We often think of "gender stereotyping" as
an expectation that biological males will possess other male traits and
biological females will possess other female traits, with little or no crossover.
The basic way of violating that expectation is what we term "trait
opposition" - that is, when a trait on one side of the masculine-feminine
gender divide is adopted by a person thought to belong on the other side (e.g.,
a boy who paints his room pink).
At a higher level of abstraction, however, gender stereotypes represent an
organizing societal principle around which people's expectations of others'
behavior are built. Violating someone's expectations tends to elicit anger or
anxiety because the violator's actions compromise the certainty of other
people's gendered behavior and identity."s With that understanding, one's
85. See Elaine Craig, Trans-Phobia and the Relational Production of Gender, 18 HASTINGS
WOMEN'S L.J. 137 (2007); Sylvia A. Law, Homosexuality and the Social Meaning of Gender,
1988 Wis. L. REv. 187; see also Laurie A. Rudman & Kimberly Fairchild, Reactions to
Counterstereotypic Behavior: The Role of Backlash in Cultural Stereotype Maintenance, 87 J.
PERSONAUTY & Soc. PSYCHOL. 157 (2004) (discussing the "backlash effect" caused by
counterstereotypical behavior).
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traits need not be entirely oppositional to one's sex in order to run afoul of
gender stereotypes. Instead, a particular trait may meld elements of both
genders into a single identity and defy categorization as masculine or feminine.
This is what Kenji Yoshino has called an "intermediate" identity and what
Ruth Colker has called a "hybrid" identity.86
Theoretically, any intermediate identity could be thought of as merely
eclectic and broken down into a combination of oppositional traits and non-
oppositional traits: a transgender person is not biologically intermediate;
rather, some individual biological traits (e.g., genitalia) are female while others
(e.g., chromosomes) are male. The question, however, is how the
discriminator conceives of the trait-at what level does he or she analyze the
trait? To the extent that people conceive of certain bundles of traits as
collectively intermediate rather than merely eclectic, the concept of
intermediacy might actually pose a more fundamental challenge than
opposition, in that it challenges the very coherence of the masculine-feminine
divide.'
Again, because our study did not examine subjective motivation, there is
the possibility that the additional prejudice towards versatile-Tom was due
entirely to some gender-indifferent source-for example, if respondents
immediately attached the same promiscuity association to versatility as others
have attached to bisexuality.88 However, penetrative versatility could well be
disliked due to its intermediate position on the gender spectrum. It certainly
has an intermediate character: we described a versatile person as someone who
"equally enjoys penetrating the other guy anally and being penetrated by the
other guy." The most persuasive evidence for the existence of intermediacy
prejudice comes from the shape of the results. If respondents had only been
concerned with trait opposition, versatility might still have been disfavored,
but not more than both top and bottom preferences. In oppositional terms,
being versatile is conceptually less violative of gender norms than being a
bottom because the opposition is incomplete; at most, being a bottom and
being versatile would be equally disfavored. That versatility stood out in our
s6. See RUTH COLKER, HYBRID: BISEXUALs, MULTIRACIALS, AND OTHER MISFITS UNDER
AMERICAN LAw, at xi-xii (1996) (using the term "hybrid" not only in the contexts of gender
and sexuality, but also the contexts of race and physical disability); Yoshino, supra note 64,
at 360.
87. See JUDITH BUTLER, GENDER TROUBLE: FEMINISM AND THE SUBVERSION OF IDENTITY 22-33
(2006); Miqqi Alicia Gilbert, Defeating Bigenderism: Changing Gender Assumptions in the
Twenty-First Century, 24 HYPATIA 93, 97 (2009).
88. See supra note 64 and accompanying text.
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results suggests that something other than, or in addition to, oppositional
prejudice was involved.
Of course, up to now, courts interpreting Title VII have applied an
opposition-based logic, perhaps with the notable exception of Shroer v.
Billington8 - that is, it is unlawful for an employer to punish an employee for
possessing traits conventionally held by the opposite sex. Even transgender
plaintiffs have had to work within that binary framework, being viewed, for
example, as biological men with female traits, including female anatomy in
some cases.9o It is uncertain, therefore, whether the current predominant
understanding of gender stereotyping, with its oppositional rhetoric, would
reach this potentially intermediacy-based prejudice against versatility. It may
be that versatility could be protected as a partial form of gender opposition, but
as with discrimination against transgender people, that view might miss the
larger point that those thought to be gender-intermediates may face unique
and higher levels of prejudice.
C. Public Opinion Implications
The results of our study also carry practical political implications for the
contemporary LGBT rights movement, to the extent that the movement is
constrained by the heterosexual majority's knowledge, biases, and opinions.
First, could greater knowledge and discussion of penetrative preferences shift
public opinion towards acceptance of bi/homosexuality? And second, do the
biases we detected in our study suggest anything about public opinion towards
bisexual, transgender, and other subcommunities within the larger movement?
Combined with the results of the attitudinal questions, our respondents'
estimates of the percentage of each preference paint an interesting picture. As
evidenced by the large variance in estimates, our respondents seemed to have
fairly vague conceptions of what gay men actually do. But within these
89. 424 F. Supp. 2d 203, 211-13 (D.D.C. 20o6) (construing Title VII to prohibit discrimination
based on "sexual identity," including gender dysphoria).
go. See Glenn v. Brumby, 663 F-3 d 1312, 1314 (iith Cir. 2011); Ilana Gelfman, Because of intersex:
Intersexuality, Title VII, and the Reality of Discrimination "Because of... [Perceived] Sex," 34
N.Y.U. REv. L. & Soc. CHANGE 55 (2010) (arguing that current Title VII doctrine conceives
of sex in a binary fashion that excludes intersex people from its protections); Andrew
Gilden, Toward a More Transformative Approach: The Limits of Transgender Formal Equality,
23 BERKELEY J. GENDER L. & JUST. 83, 85-86 (20o8); Amanda Raflo, Evolving Protection for
Transgender Employees Under Title VII's Sex Discrimination Prohibition: A New Era Where
Gender Is More than Chromosomes, 2 CHARLOTTE L. REV. 217 (2010); Ilona M. Turner, Sex
Stereotyping Per Se: Transgender Employees and Title VII, 95 CALIF. L. REV. 561, 586 (2007).
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fluctuations, we found that respondents tended to underestimate the
prevalence of versatiles and bottoms, sexual identities that they comparatively
disfavored, and overestimated the prevalence of tops, the sexual identity that
they comparatively favored. Heterosexuals' ignorance therefore seems to allow
them to carry a more gender-normative depiction of the gay community than is
true, and may thereby inflate their overall opinion of the community. We also
found a modest framing effect in that we could reduce respondents'
overestimation of tops by presenting them with more vignettes featuring
bottoms. Perhaps, therefore, greater visibility of and openness about gay men's
sexual practices might actually lead some heterosexual observers to hold less
favorable attitudes towards the community.
That the respondents found penetrative versatility to be particularly
troubling also suggests that other intermediate groups such as bisexual and
transgender people face deep attitudinal hurdles due to the nature of their
gender violations. It suggests that even if the movement could erase decades of
built-up narratives about what it means to be bisexual or transgender, these
groups still might not be on equal footing with their homosexual allies.
Perhaps even more troubling, these results further suggest that homosexuals
may in fact possess very real incentives to distance themselves from the more
gender-threatening elements of the LGBT movement.9" Indeed, some
commentators have accused the LGBT establishment of doing precisely that.9 2
And to the extent that the LGBT movement is including bisexuality and
transgender identity in its messaging, would it actually see stronger gains if it
excluded them altogether?
Rather than pander to the current biases built into public perception,
however, the LGBT rights movement could perhaps reshape those perceptions.
One approach would be to attack the problem head-on and wage a public
relations campaign directly aimed at raising the general public's comfort level
with intermediacy. An important tactic would be the ability to normalize
intermediacy, to show that it is not something entirely alien to the average
person's existence. Allies of the movement could acknowledge the myriad ways
in which they engage in trait opposition, but reframe this as a matter of an
overall intermediate identity (e.g., "I'm not entirely a man or entirely a woman
in how I dress, behave, or think," rather than "I'm a man who happens to have
a few feminine traits").
91. See Yoshino, supra note 64, at 399-429 (discussing the interests that homosexuals have in
erasing bisexuality from public discourse).
92. See, e.g., Jillian Todd Weiss, GL vs. BT: The Archaeology ofBiphobia and Transphobia Within
the U.S. Gay and Lesbian Community, 3 J. BISEXUALITY 25, 27 (2003).
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CONCLUSION
Whether one is making a determination about the plausibility of gender-
motivated employment discrimination or drawing up strategic plans for
advancing the social status of gender-nonconforming groups, it is essential to
understand how and why society favors some groups over others. In this Essay,
we have argued that sexual behavior is indeed socially gendered beyond its
connection to sexual orientation and sufficiently so to bring out actual
prejudice, but that this is not always the case and will depend on the specific
context. And by analogy, these same gender dynamics likely impact the ways in
which many members of the broader LGBT community are perceived in
certain situations.
Courts therefore should not categorically exempt employers' attitudes
towards sexual behavior in an effort to limit Price Waterhouse's scope. To do so
would be to disregard the possibility of blatant gender-motivated
discrimination. Instead, courts should draw the line in accordance with the
evidence of defendants' actual motivations. Until Congress decides to amend
Title VII, employers are free under federal law to discriminate against
bi/homosexuality, but not in a way that relies upon the view that certain sexual
practices make someone less of a man or less of a woman.
Our findings may also have relevance to participants in debates over LGBT
rights. Many heterosexual people may be operating with a more gender-
normative view of gay sexual practices than is accurate. Members of the LGBT
rights movement should be aware of the possible differential effects of trait
opposition and intermediacy on public opinion, and should consider whether
and how that disparity ought to be addressed.
There are still many questions to be answered about what goes on in the
minds of those who discriminate based on sex, gender, and sexuality. It is
difficult to imagine how courts can properly conceive of what gender-
motivated discrimination means without a systematic model of the ways in
which gender categories shape perception, supported by a body of empirical
findings. This Essay has aimed to make a small contribution to that model, in
the hope that one day the values expressed in Price Waterhouse will be fully
realized, both inside and outside the legal system.
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APPENDIX
Table 1.




Sex Male 305 37%
Female 523 63%
Hispanic/Latino Yes 53 6%
No 774 94%
Race American Indian or Alaska Native 9 1%
East Asian 8o 10%
South Asian 31 4%
Native Hawaiian or Pacific Islander 3 0%
Black or African American 36 4%
White 631 76%
More than one race 23 3%
Other 14 2%
Majority of Yes 744 90%
Time in the U.S. No 83 10%
Education Elementary or middle 2 0%
Some high school 6 1%
High school graduate 74 9%
Some college 253 31%
College graduate 236 29%
Some graduate school 69 8%
Graduate degree 188 23%
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TOPS, BOTTOMS, AND VERSATILES
Table 2.
SUMMARY OF RESPONSES TO QUESTION "IF TOM INVITED YOU TO GO TO A
BARBECUE FESTIVAL WITH HIM, WOULD YOU GO?" AND MANN-WHITNEY P-
VALUES TESTING FOR STATISTICALLY SIGNIFICANT DIFFERENCES IN RESPONSES






























* The mean is provided here only for illustrative purposes, not for statistical
inference. Because the data is non-interval, nonparametric methods (Mann-
Whitney) were used for the comparisons between the versions of Tom.
* Statistically significant difference in responses at the a = o.1o level
** Statistically significant difference in responses at the a = 0.05 level
Statistically significant difference in responses at the a = o.oi level
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Table 2a.
AMONG MALE RESPONDENTS UNDER AGE 33, SUMMARY OF RESPONSES TO
QUESTION "IF TOM INVITED YOU TO GO TO A BARBECUE FESTIVAL WITH HIM,
WOULD YOU GO?" AND MANN-WHITNEY P-VALUES TESTING FOR STATISTICALLY
SIGNIFICANT DIFFERENCES IN RESPONSES BETWEEN VERSIONS OF TOM





versatile 43 3.44 p 0.126
Tom =
bottom 33 3.55 0.280 0.849
o The mean is provided here only for illustrative purposes, not for statistical
inference. Because the data is non-interval, nonparametric methods (Mann-
Whitney) were used for the comparisons between the versions of Tom.
* Statistically significant difference in responses at the a = o.io level
** Statistically significant difference in responses at the a = o.o5 level
Statistically significant difference in responses at the a = o.o level
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TOPS, BOTTOMS, AND VERSATILES
Table 2b.
AMONG FEMALE RESPONDENTS UNDER AGE 33, SUMMARY OF RESPONSES TO
QUESTION "IF TOM INVITED YOU TO GO TO A BARBECUE FESTIVAL WITH HIM,
WOULD YOU GO?" AND MANN-WHITNEY P-VALUES TESTING FOR STATISTICALLY
SIGNIFICANT DIFFERENCES IN RESPONSES BETWEEN VERSIONS OF TOM





versatile 67 4.61 p = 0.114
Tom =
bottom 68 4.71 0.418 0.424
O The mean is provided here only for illustrative purposes, not for statistical
inference. Because the data is non-interval, nonparametric methods (Mann-
Whitney) were used for the comparisons between the versions of Tom.
* Statistically significant difference in responses at the a = o.io level
** Statistically significant difference in responses at the a = 0.05 level
Statistically significant difference in responses at the a = o.oi level
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Table 2C.
AMONG MALE RESPONDENTS AGE 33 OR OLDER, SUMMARY OF RESPONSES TO
QUESTION "IF TOM INVITED YOU TO GO TO A BARBECUE FESTIVAL WITH HIM,
WOULD YOU GO?" AND MANN-WHITNEY P-VALUES TESTING FOR STATISTICALLY
SIGNIFICANT DIFFERENCES IN RESPONSES BETWEEN VERSIONS OF TOM





versatile 38 3.18 p = 0.171
Tom =
bottom 38 3.68 0.412 0.327
O The mean is provided here only for illustrative purposes, not for statistical
inference. Because the data is non-interval, nonparametric methods (Mann-
Whitney) were used for the comparisons between the versions of Tom.
* Statistically significant difference in responses at the a = o.io level
** Statistically significant difference in responses at the a = 0.05 level
Statistically significant difference in responses at the a = o.oi level
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TOPS, BOTTOMS, AND VERSATILES
Table 2d.
AMONG FEMALE RESPONDENTS AGE 33 OR OLDER, SUMMARY OF RESPONSES TO
QUESTION "IF TOM INVITED YOU TO GO TO A BARBECUE FESTIVAL WITH HIM,
WOULD YOU GO?" AND MANN-WHITNEY P-VALUES TESTING FOR STATISTICALLY
SIGNIFICANT DIFFERENCES IN RESPONSES BETWEEN VERSIONS OF TOM






versatile 73 4.16 p = o.834
Tom -
bottom 64 4.47 0.412 0.576
O The mean is provided here only for illustrative purposes, not for statistical
inference. Because the data is non-interval, nonparametric methods (Mann-
Whitney) were used for the comparisons between the versions of Tom.
* Statistically significant difference in responses at the a = o.io level
** Statistically significant difference in responses at the a = 0.05 level
Statistically significant difference in responses at the a = o.oi level
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Table 3.
SUMMARY OF RESPONSES TO QUESTION "IF TOM INVITED YOU OVER FOR
COCKTAILS WITH SOME OF YOUR MUTUAL FRIENDS, WOULD YOU GO?" AND
MANN-WHITNEY P-VALUES TESTING FOR STATISTICALLY SIGNIFICANT





























O The mean is provided here only for illustrative purposes, not for statistical
inference. Because the data is non-interval, nonparametric methods (Mann-
Whitney) were used for the comparisons between the versions of Tom.
* Statistically significant difference in responses at the a = o.io level
** Statistically significant difference in responses at the a = o.o5 level
Statistically significant difference in responses at the a = o.oi level
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TOPS, BOTTOMS, AND VERSATILES
Table 3a.
AMONG MALE RESPONDENTS UNDER AGE 33, SUMMARY OF RESPONSES TO
QUESTION "IF TOM INVITED YOU OVER FOR COCKTAILS WITH SOME OF YOUR
MUTUAL FRIENDS, WOULD YOU GO?" AND MANN-WHITNEY P-VALUES TESTING
FOR STATISTICALLY SIGNIFICANT DIFFERENCES IN RESPONSES BETWEEN
VERSIONS OF TOM





versatile 43 3.51 p = 0.052
Tom=
bottom 33 3.73 0.211 0.603
O The mean is provided here only for illustrative purposes, not for statistical
inference. Because the data is non-interval, nonparametric methods (Mann-
Whitney) were used for the comparisons between the versions of Tom.
* Statistically significant difference in responses at the a = o.1o level
** Statistically significant difference in responses at the a = 0.05 level
Statistically significant difference in responses at the a = o.oi level
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Table 3b.
AMONG FEMALE RESPONDENTS UNDER AGE 33, SUMMARY OF RESPONSES TO
QUESTION "IF TOM INVITED YOU OVER FOR COCKTAILS WITH SOME OF YOUR
MUTUAL FRIENDS, WOULD YOU GO?" AND MANN-WHITNEY P-VALUES TESTING
FOR STATISTICALLY SIGNIFICANT DIFFERENCES IN RESPONSES BETWEEN
VERSIONS OF TOM





versatile 67 4.54 p = 0.035'
Tom =
bottom 68 4.90 0.332 0.223
* The mean is provided here only for illustrative purposes, not for statistical
inference. Because the data is non-interval, nonparametric methods (Mann-
Whitney) were used for the comparisons between the versions of Tom.
* Statistically significant difference in responses at the a = o.io level
** Statistically significant difference in responses at the a = 0.05 level
Statistically significant difference in responses at the a = 0.01 level
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TOPS, BOTTOMS, AND VERSATILES
Table 3c.
AMONG MALE RESPONDENTS AGE 33 OR OLDER, SUMMARY OF RESPONSES TO
QUESTION "IF TOM INVITED YOU OVER FOR COCKTAILS WITH SOME OF YOUR
MUTUAL FRIENDS, WOULD YOU GO?" AND MANN-WHITNEY P-VALUES TESTING
FOR STATISTICALLY SIGNIFICANT DIFFERENCES IN RESPONSES BETWEEN
VERSIONS OF TOM





versatile 38 3-53 p 0.129
Tom =
bottom 38 3.66 0.039** 0.873
* The mean is provided here only for illustrative purposes, not for statistical
inference. Because the data is non-interval, nonparametric methods (Mann-
Whitney) were used for the comparisons between the versions of Tom.
* Statistically significant difference in responses at the a = o.io level
** Statistically significant difference in responses at the a = 0.05 level
Statistically significant difference in responses at the a = o.oi level
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Table 3d.
AMONG FEMALE RESPONDENTS AGE 33 OR OLDER, SUMMARY OF RESPONSES TO
OUESTION "IF TOM INVITED YOU OVER FOR COCKTAILS WITH SOME OF YOUR
MUTUAL FRIENDS, WOULD YOU GO?" AND MANN-WHITNEY P-VALUES TESTING
FOR STATISTICALLY SIGNIFICANT DIFFERENCES IN RESPONSES BETWEEN
VERSIONS OF TOM





versatile 73 4.42 p 0.569
Tom =
bottom 64 4.55 0.682 0.849
O The mean is provided here only for illustrative purposes, not for statistical
inference. Because the data is non-interval, nonparametric methods (Mann-
Whitney) were used for the comparisons between the versions of Tom.
* Statistically significant difference in responses at the a = o.io level
** Statistically significant difference in responses at the a = 0.05 level
* Statistically significant difference in responses at the a = o.oi level
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TOPS, BOTTOMS, AND VERSATILES
Table 4.
SUMMARY OF RESPONSES TO QUESTION "DO YOU THINK TOM WOULD
ORDINARILY 'PASS' AS A STRAIGHT MAN IN A SOCIAL SITUATION?" AND MANN-
WHITNEY P-VALUES TESTING FOR STATISTICALLY SIGNIFICANT DIFFERENCES IN
RESPONSES BETWEEN VERSIONS OF TOM




















* The mean is provided here only for illustrative purposes, not for statistical
inference. Because the data is non-interval, nonparametric methods (Mann-
Whitney) were used for the comparisons between the versions of Tom.
* Statistically significant difference in responses at the a = o.io level
** Statistically significant difference in responses at the a = 0.05 level
Statistically significant difference in responses at the a = o.oi level
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Table 5.
SUMMARY OF RESPONSES TO QUESTION "ARE RON AND LAURIE A COUPLE YOU
CAN SEE YOURSELF BEING FRIENDS WITH?" AND MANN-WHITNEY P-VALUES
TESTING FOR STATISTICALLY SIGNIFICANT DIFFERENCES IN RESPONSES BETWEEN
VERSIONS OF LAURIE AND RON
N Meano Ron = Ron = Laurie =
banker; banker; banker;
















Ron = 212 4.42 0.124 0.984 0.576
penetrator
* The mean is provided here only for illustrative purposes, not for statistical
inference. Because the data is non-interval, nonparametric methods (Mann-
Whitney) were used for the comparisons between the versions of Laurie and Ron.
* Statistically significant difference in responses at the a = 0.10 level
** Statistically significant difference in responses at the a = 0.05 level
Statistically significant difference in responses at the a = o.oi level
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TOPS, BOTTOMS, AND VERSATILES
Table 6.
SUMMARY OF RESPONSES TO OUESTION "HOW LIKELY DO YOU THINK IT IS THAT
RON HAS OCCASIONAL HOMOSEXUAL DESIRES?" AND MANN-WHITNEY P-
VALUES TESTING FOR STATISTICALLY SIGNIFICANT DIFFERENCES IN RESPONSES
BETWEEN VERSIONS OF LAURIE AND RON
N Meano Ron = Ron = Laurie =
banker; banker; banker;
















Ron = 212 2.87 <o.ooo*** 0.478 <o.ooo1***
penetrator
* The mean is provided here only for illustrative purposes, not for statistical
inference. Because the data is non-interval, nonparametric methods (Mann-
Whitney) were used for the comparisons between the versions of Laurie and Ron.
* Statistically significant difference in responses at the a = o.io level
** Statistically significant difference in responses at the a = o.o5 level
Statistically significant difference in responses at the a = o.o level
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Table 7.
SUMMARY OF RESPONSES TO QUESTION "HOW LIKELY DO YOU THINK IT IS THAT
LAURIE HAS OCCASIONAL HOMOSEXUAL DESIRES?" AND MANN-WHITNEY P-
VALUES TESTING FOR STATISTICALLY SIGNIFICANT DIFFERENCES IN RESPONSES








































o The mean is provided here only for illustrative purposes, not for statistical
inference. Because the data is non-interval, nonparametric methods (Mann-
Whitney) were used for the comparisons between the versions of Laurie and Ron.
* Statistically significant difference in responses at the a = o.io level
** Statistically significant difference in responses at the a = 0.05 level
*** Statistically significant difference in responses at the a = o.oi level
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TOPS, BOTTOMS, AND VERSATILES
Table 8.
SUMMARY OF RESPONSES TO QUESTION "IF YOU HAD TO GUESS, WHAT
PERCENTAGE OF GAY MEN DO YOU THINK ARE 'TOPS' (ONLY LIKE TO PENETRATE
OTHER GUYS), 'BOTTOMS' (ONLY LIKE BEING PENETRATED BY OTHER GUYS), AND
'VERSATILES' (EQUALLY ENJOY BOTH)?" AND PERCENTAGE OF RESPONSES
OUTSIDE OF "GUESSES OF REALITY" RANGE
Tops Bottoms Versatiles
Mean estimate 31.5% 27.9% 40.6%
Standard deviation of estimate 13.5% 12.4% 18.8%
Range of guesses of reality 19-20% 26-35% 47-54%
% with upbias (overestimate) 79% 21% 18%
% with downbias (underestimate) 9% 51% 58%
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Table g.
ORDINARY LEAST SQUARES REGRESSION OF RESPONDENTS' GUESSES ABOUT
PREVALENCE OF EACH PENETRATIVE PREFERENCE, AS A FUNCTION OF HOW
MANY CHARACTERS OF EACH PREFERENCE THEY WERE EXPOSED TO
THROUGHOUT THE EXPERIMENT
Variables (1) (2) (3)
GUESST GUESSV GUESSB
NUMT 0.140 0.105 -0.245
(0.236) (0.330) (0.216)
NUMV 0.004 -0.091 0.087
(0.238) (0.332) (0.218)
NUMB -o.556** 0.517 0.039
(o.241) (0.337) (0.221)
Constant 32.61*** 39.12*** 28.27***
(1.702) (2.379) (1-561)
Observations 827 827 827
R 0.012 0.005 0.003
Standard errors in parentheses
GUESST = predicted guess for the prevalence of tops
GUESSV = predicted guess for the prevalence of versatiles
GUESSB = predicted guess for the prevalence of bottoms
NUMT = number of top characters respondent was exposed to
NUMV = number of versatile characters respondent was exposed to
NUMB = number of bottom characters respondent was exposed to
* Statistically significant at the io% level
** Statistically significant at the 5% level
Statistically significant at the 1% level
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